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Abstract 
Young adults adaptively coordinate their behavior to avoid demands placed on cognitive 
control. We investigated how this adaptive coordination develops by having 6-7- and 11-12-
year-olds and young adults complete a demand selection task, in which participants could select 
between two tasks that varied in cognitive control demands via differences in rule switch 
frequency. Adults and older children exhibited significant preference for selecting the less 
demanding task, as well as a metacognitive signal guiding adaptive demand avoidance behavior 
across a variety of behavioral and self-report assessments. In contrast, despite evidence of 
differential demands on cognitive control, younger children did not coordinate their task 
selections to avoid higher demand. Together, these findings suggest that sensitivity and adaptive 
responses to control demands emerge with development and are consistent with gradual 
development of lateral prefrontal cortex, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, and their functional 
connectivity, which support effort avoidance in adults.  
Highlights 
 
● Adults and 11-12-year-olds avoided cognitive control demands but 6-7yo did not, despite 
all ages exhibiting evidence of demand signals. 
 
● Adults and 11-12yo but not 6-7yo had subjective awareness of cognitive control 
demands. 
 
● Older children may especially attend to external cues, such as feedback or accurate 
performance to ascertain demand differences, whereas adults may develop cognitive 
demand sensitivity from internal effort signals. 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Exerting cognitive control, the goal-oriented regulation of one’s thoughts, actions, and 
emotions, is effortful (Kool, McGuire, Rosen & Botvinick, 2010; Kurzban, Duckworth, Kable, & 
Myers, 2013). Given a less demanding option, adults typically coordinate their behavior to avoid 
unnecessary cognitive demands (Dunn, Lutes, & Risko, 2016), and more specifically, effortful 
cognitive control (Gold, Kool, Botvinick, Hubzin, August, & Waltz, 2014; Kool et al., 2010; 
McGuire & Botvinick, 2010). Deciding when and the extent to which effortful control should be 
engaged is believed to rely on two metacognitive processes: a metacognitive awareness of one’s 
subjective experience and valuation of cognitive effort and a metacognitive control process in 
which that information is leveraged in subsequent decision-making (Efklides, 2006; Destan, 
Hembacher, Ghetti, & Roebers, 2014).  
However, little is known about how these processes supporting effort-based decision-
making and cognitive demand avoidance develop. Sensitivity to control demands, as well as 
decisions regarding when and how to exert cognitive control, may drive and support cognitive 
control development (Chevalier, 2015; Chevalier, Martis, Curran, & Munakata, 2015; Munakata, 
Snyder, Chatham, 2012; Davidson, Amso, Anderson, & Diamond, 2006). Children’s subjective 
experiences of cognitive control could influence when and how children implement control and 
the types of activities that children engage in. Children may be less sensitive to variations in 
control demands or less likely to utilize this information to avoid unnecessary demands than 
adults. However, cognitive control is typically poor overall in children relative to adults and 
becomes more efficient throughout development (Chevalier, Huber, Wiebe, & Espy, 2013; 
Davidson et al., 2006; Carlson, 2005); thus, children may be especially motivated to avoid 
demand by selecting a low- over a high-demand control task. Whether children are more or less 
likely than adults to avoid cognitive control demands remains to be clarified.  
Control demand avoidance has been investigated in adults using a demand selection task 
(DST), in which participants are able to freely select between two tasks that differ in control 
demands (Kool et al., 2010). Participants were not instructed of task differences but could 
discover that one task option switched rules more frequently than the other, resulting in greater 
control demand (Monsell, 2003). Across a series of experiments, adults exhibited preference for 
the less demanding task, demonstrating sensitivity to and behavioral coordination away from 
cognitive control demands (Kool et al., 2010; Gold et al., 2015). Young children have been 
shown to coordinate behavior away from difficult task options within a DST paradigm. Children 
aged 5 years coordinated behavior away from the difficult task if provided feedback and explicit 
instruction to select the easier task when difficulty differences involved magnitude 
discrimination between two arrays of dots; without this scaffolding, however, 5yo children did 
not coordinate behavior away from difficulty (O’Leary & Sloutsky, 2017). When provided by-
trial feedback and extensive familiarization with each task option prior to choosing, 5yo also 
coordinated behavior away from difficulty and exhibited marginal evidence of correctly 
identifying difficulty differences between tasks (O’Leary, 2017).  
Notably, this prior work taxed an automatic cognitive process, the approximate number 
system, rather than rule-guided cognitive control processes. Older children do appear to be 
sensitive to control demands within an N-back task framework. When given the option to play 
different levels of N-back tasks for reward after familiarization with the N-back options, children 
aged 7-12 years required great incentive to perform more difficult N-backs (e.g., 2-back vs. 1-
back) (Chevalier, 2017). These results suggest that young children can recognize task difficulty 
and monitor performance and can also coordinate behavior away from task difficulty. Whether 
these findings in children extend to general control demand avoidance and whether control 
demand avoidance changes with age have not yet been investigated. 
Overlapping brain networks involving lateral prefrontal cortex (lPFC) and dorsal anterior 
cingulate (dACC) have been implicated in both cognitive control and cognitive demand 
avoidance (Power & Peterson, 2013; Dosenbach, Fair, Cohen, Schlagger, & Peterson, 2008; 
Shenhav, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2013; Shenhav, Musslick, Lieder, Kool, Griffiths, Cohen, & 
Botvinick, 2017). In an fMRI study utilizing a task-switching DST paradigm, participants with 
the greatest difference in left lPFC activity between the low-demand and high-demand blocks 
also most strongly avoided cognitive demand (McGuire & Botvinick, 2010). dACC specifically 
has been implicated in monitoring task performance and effort (Shenhav, Cohen, & Botvinick, 
2016; Shenhav et al., 2017) and subjective feelings of cognitive effort (Botvinick, Huffstetler, & 
McGuire, 2009). Functional connections from dACC to lPFC have also been suggested to initiate 
the top-down behavioral control and coordination necessary to avoid demands on cognition 
(Shenhav et al., 2017; Shenhav et al., 2013; McGuire & Botvinick, 2010).  
Throughout development, activation and circuitry between various regions within PFC 
and dACC reorganizes and integrates (Luna, Padmanabhan, & O’Hearn, 2010). During an 
inhibitory control task adjusted to equate performance across age, adults exhibited increased 
dACC and PFC activation compared with 10-17yo children and adolescents (Rubia, Smith, 
Taylor, & Brammer, 2007). Children aged 8-12 years exhibit less dACC activity differentiation 
between correct and error trials than adolescents and adults, even though these children are able 
to recognize trials on which they made an error (Velanova, Wheeler, & Luna, 2008). 
Additionally, children aged 8-12 years fail to recruit ventrolateral PFC regions during inhibitory 
control tasks relative to adults (Bunge, Dudukovic, Thomason, Vaidya, & Gabrieli, 2002), 
perhaps because young children receive a weaker effort signal to guide subsequent behavior. 
Although children exhibit behavioral evidence of differential control demands, the underlying 
neural mechanisms required to utilize these signals may be too immature in young children to 
drive adaptive behavior away from control demands. 
To determine whether children exhibit sensitivity to and avoidance of control demands, 
we tested 6-7- and 11-12-year-old children and adults on a child-adapted rule-switch DST 
paradigm. The two child age groups were chosen based on prior work demonstrating that 6-7- 
and 11-12-year-old children differ substantially from one another and from adults in their 
cognitive control profiles while still being able to understand and complete our DST paradigm 
(Destan et al., 2014; Lyons & Ghetti, 2013; Chevalier, 2015; Chevalier et al., 2015), such that we 
could test for differences in their ability to adaptively coordinate behavior based on cognitive 
control demands. Adults were included for age comparisons and to provide a conceptual 
replication of demand avoidance with our child-adapted DST paradigm. Participants were first 
familiarized with both tasks before being allowed to choose which task to play. Then, 
participants were asked which task they preferred, which task was easier, and why. Lastly, a 
subset of child participants also completed a motivational frameworks questionnaire to assess 
whether intelligence beliefs influenced control demand preferences. 
Materials and Methods 
Participants 
Forty-seven 6-7-year-olds (M=6.41, SD=0.39, range: 5.59-7.34; 26 male), 48 11-12yo 
children (M=11.73, SD=0.30, range=11.06-12.62; 27 male), and 45 undergraduate adults 
(M=19.53, SD=1.53, range=18-25; four age unknown; 21 male) were recruited to participate. 
Child participants were recruited from the participant database of the Cognitive Development 
Center maintained at the University of Colorado-Boulder. Informed consent was obtained from 
legal parents/guardians, and child assent (verbal and/or written) was obtained prior to 
participation. Parents/guardians received minimal monetary compensation for travel costs, and 
child participants received a moderate token for study participation, regardless of performance. 
Adult participants were recruited from the Department of Psychology and Neuroscience subject 
pool at the University of Colorado-Boulder for partial course credit. Written informed consent 
was obtained prior to participation. Participants were tested at the Cognitive Development Center 
at the University of Colorado Boulder, and the local Institutional Review Board approved all 
study procedures. 
Demand Selection Task 
The Demand Selection Task (DST; E-Prime 1.2, Psychology Software Tools, Inc., 
Pittsburgh, PA) was adapted for children from Kool and colleagues (2010). Several adaptations 
were made to the task in accordance with those in Gold and colleagues (2014), including making 
stable and superficially similar decks, adding a familiarization phase, and enabling deck choice 
after every choice trial. Critically, participants were still not notified of any differences between 
decks. The task was introduced as “The Santa Claus Game”, in which participants were asked to 
help Santa prepare for next Christmas by sorting toys (i.e., “targets”) according to their color or 
shape. Four targets were used (red or blue car or bear). Participants saw a smiley face and heard 
a positive sound after correct trials and a frowning face and negative sound after incorrect trials 
to provide immediate trial feedback. After each correct trial, participants were given a piece of 
digital candy shown at the bottom right of the screen; a candy piece was removed after incorrect 
trials or responses more than twice the participant’s mean RT during the independent rule 
practice. The candy count enabled long-term tracking of general performance and provided 
continued motivation for participants to perform well throughout the task.   
Rule Practice: Each sorting rule was explained in turn, followed by four practice trials 
with each rule and four mixed rule practice trials. Each set of practice trials could be repeated 
until participants understood the rule, and participants were instructed to respond to the target 
according to the cued rule as quickly and accurately as possible. Response buttons were 
identified via two multidimensional pictures (e.g., a red bear to indicate red and bear responses 
and a blue car to indicate blue and car responses) displayed on the bottom left and right of the 
screen, respectively, and also presented on the response pad horizontally beneath the response 
buttons. Response option sides were counterbalanced across participants. After practice trials, 
participants completed 20 mixed-rule practice trials without guidance from the experimenter. 
Mean RT was recorded to determine RT limits for each participant. 
Baseline Deck Familiarization Phase: Participants were instructed that for the following 
trials, the toys would be drawn from two green card decks on the upper left and right of the 
screen, to continue to respond as quickly and accurately as possible, and to pay attention to 
which decks the toys came from. Green cards descended directly from the decks and were 
flipped when reaching the middle of the screen. If participants responded greater than twice their 
mean RT over the 20 mixed-rule practice trials but sorted correctly, a timer appeared indicating 
that the response was too slow. Negative feedback was presented if responses were incorrect, 
regardless of RT. Participants completed 40 baseline trials (20/deck) divided into 10-trial blocks. 
Critically, the decks differed in rule switch/repeat frequency; one deck (high-demand deck) 
contained 90% rule switches, and the other deck (low-demand deck) contained 10% rule 
switches. Low-demand deck placement (left or right side) was counterbalanced across 
participants. 
Practice Deck Choice Phase: Upon completing this baseline phase, participants then 
practiced choosing both the left and right decks for ten trials each. Right and left deck selections 
were made with two response buttons between the target response buttons and were indicated 
beneath the response buttons with two rectangles. Prior to each trial, participants fixated on a 
plus sign between the two decks. A question mark appeared in place of the fixation cross to 
indicate that participants could now choose which deck to play. After selection, targets 
descended from directly beneath the decks.  
Deck Choice Phase: After deck selection practice, participants were informed that they 
could choose whichever deck they preferred to play after every trial, that they were free to switch 
decks whenever they wanted, and that if they began to prefer one deck more than the other, they 
could play that deck more often or even all the time. Participants then completed 102 free-choice 
trials across three blocks (34, 35, and 33 trials, respectively). 
 When participants had completed all choice trials, the experimenter asked whether the 
participant preferred one deck more than the other and why and whether the participant thought 
one deck was easier than the other and why. If participants did not report a preference/easier 
deck, the experimenter asked the question again, prefaced with the phrase “If you had to 
choose…” Participant responses were recorded on paper by hand by the experimenter. 
Responses were then digitized and blinded for coding. For analyses regarding responses to these 
questions, answers to the initial question and the forced choice question were collapsed to form a 
single self-reported deck preference and reported easier deck. The DST typically ranged from 35 
– 45 minutes in length. 
Motivational Frameworks Questionnaire 
After completing the DST, 6-7yo (N=22) and 11-12yo (N=31) participants completed a 
verbally administered Motivational Frameworks Questionnaire (Appendix A) adapted from 
Gunderson, Romero, Dweck, Goldin-Meadow, and Levine (2013) to assess a participant’s fixed 
versus growth intelligence mindset. After 22 participants, the questionnaire was dropped from 
the 6-7yo protocol due to total session length commonly exceeding 1 hour. Participants 
responded verbally using a five-point thumbs scale (1-5) or by pointing at images of thumbs 
ranging in orientation from thumbs down (“I do not agree”) to thumbs up (“I do agree”) or by 
verbally responding yes or no when appropriate. Standardized z-scores were created for 
intelligence-domain items and socio-moral-domain items, and a composite measure was created 
by averaging the two standardized scores (11-12yo: M=0, SD=0.65; 6-7yo: M=0, SD=0.82). 
Open-ended questions were not scored, resulting in 12 intelligence-domain questions and 2 
socio-moral-domain questions.  
Statistical Analysis 
This project was preregistered with the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/y2gbr/), 
and analyses were conducted as proposed unless otherwise noted. Additional analyses will be 
described as exploratory. For RT data, responses faster than 200 ms and slower than 10,000 ms 
were excluded, as well as RTs on incorrect trials. Low-demand deck preference was defined as 
the proportion of choice trials in which participants selected the low-demand deck. Because low-
demand deck preferences were not normally distributed (Shapiro-Wilk normality test: overall: 
p<.001; all group ps<.09), Wilcoxon signed-rank tests against chance deck selection (i.e., 50%) 
were used to determine deck preference, as in Kool et al. (2011); additionally, Bayes factors 
testing specifically for demand avoidance are included. All analyses were performed with the 
open-source R software (https://www.rstudio.com/), and the analysis script and data are available 
at the Open Science Framework. Bayes factors were calculated using the BayesFactor package in 
R and are presented for all proportion tests and correlations. Data were visualized using the 
ggplot2 package in R.  
Results 
Four 6-7yo and one 11-12yo opted to quit the study session prior to completion, resulting 
in 43 6-7yo, 47 11-12yo, and 45 adult participants. Additionally, one 11-12yo declined to answer 
post-task preference and easy questions. Explanations for deck preference and easier deck 
questions were unavailable in an additional 11-12yo and one 6-7yo and unavailable for the easier 
deck question in another 11-12yo. 
 To preview, we first present behavioral results from the baseline deck familiarization 
phase and rule switch costs for accuracy and RT. Then, we examine evidence of avoidance of 
control demands, predictors of demand avoidance, and subjective awareness of deck differences. 
Overall, we observed consistent signals of control demand awareness and avoidance in adults 
and 11-12yo but not in 6-7yo.  
Deck Familiarization Baseline Performance  
 
Marginal group differences in overall accuracy were observed (F(2,132)=2.469, p=.089; 
adults: M=89.21% (SD: 6.32); 11-12yo: M=85.41% (SD=8.82); 6-7yo: M=88.01% (SD=9.77)). 
RTs were averaged within participants and then log transformed. Significant group differences 
were observed between log RTs on correct trials (F(2,132)=175.9, p<.001; adults: M=6.62 
(SD=0.21); 11-12yo: M=6.93 (SD=0.30); 6-7yo: M=7.67 (SD=0.29). We next confirmed the 
anticipated differences between switch and repeat trials during the baseline deck familiarization 
phase. As expected, all groups were significantly more accurate on repeat trials than switch trials 
(adults: M=6.93%, t=6.214, p<.001; 11-12yo: M=7.56%, t=6.0311, p<.001; 6-7yo: M=5.70%, 
t=4.586, p<.01), and differences in accuracy (accuracy switch costs) between switch and repeat 
trials did not differ between groups (F(2,132)=0.609, p=.545). Correct log RTs were significantly 
faster on repeat than switch trials across groups (adults: M=0.101, t=6.108, p<.001; 11-12yo: 
M=0.114, t=5.045, p<.001; 6-7yo: M=0.078, t=3.261, p<.01), and differences in log RT on 
correct switch versus repeat trials (log RT switch costs) did not differ between groups 
(F(2,132)=0.722, p=.488). Thus, all age groups exhibited similar signals of control demands to 
utilize for subsequent deck choice behavior. Descriptive performance statistics are presented in 
Table 1. 
Cognitive Demand Avoidance 
 
 Across groups, low-demand deck preference was significantly greater than chance 
(M=57.88%; p<.01). Group differences in low-demand deck selections did not reach statistical 
significance (Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared=3.653, p=.161).1 However, adults and 11-12yo low-
demand deck selections were significantly higher than chance (adults: M=58.04%, p=.021, 
BF10=1.59; 11-12yo: M=63.29%, p<.001, BF10=87.50), whereas 6-7yo did not significantly 
differ from chance (M=52.27%, p=.755, BF10=0.25) (Figure 2).2 Thus, these results provide 
                                                        
1 A power analysis indicates 95% power with the current sample size to detect an effect size of Cohen’s d=.75, 
estimated from Exp. 1 from Kool et al. (2010), which most closely matches our paradigm, against a similar 
distribution centered at chance deck selections (G*Power 3.1, Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). However, 
the substantially smaller adult demand avoidance and larger standard deviation observed here are likely reasons for 
the lack of significant group differences in low-demand deck selections.  
2 Given a high number of participants exclusively selecting the high-demand deck, especially in 6-7yo, we explored 
potential group differences deck switch frequency, reasoning that younger children may consistently repeat deck 
selections to reduce cognitive demands. Although these analyses are confounded by deck differences (and sensitivity 
to these differences), no group differences in deck switch frequency were observed (F(2,132)=.636, p=.531). We also 
explored whether groups differed deck switching after error commission. No significant differences between groups 
deck switching after errors relative to correct responses were observed (F(2,132)=2.192, p=.116), and no groups were 
significantly more likely to switch decks after an error relative to after correct responses (adults: t=0.253, p=0.803; 
11-12yo: t=1.458, p=0.152, 6-7yo: t=-1.501, p=0.141).  
 
evidence that adults and 11-12yo children adapted their behavior away from unnecessary control 
demands but that 6-7yo children did not.  
Switch Costs Predict Low-Demand Deck Preference in Adults and Older Children 
Baseline switch costs in adults significantly correlated with low-demand deck preference 
(r=.346, p=.020, BF10=2.89) (Figure 3A), as in Kool et al. (2010); however, this relationship was 
not observed in the 11-12yo or 6-7yo groups (11-12yo: r=-.094, p=.530; 6-7yo: r=-.041, p=.796). 
Exploratory Fisher’s r-to-z’ transformations indicated that this correlation in adults was 
significantly different from the two child groups combined (z=2.14, p=.032). 
 Because baseline switch costs did not predict low-demand deck selections in children, we 
next explored whether accuracy costs, that is, difference in accuracy on switch relative to repeat 
trials, during the familiarization phase predicted subsequent low-demand deck selections. 
Accuracy switch costs predicted low-demand deck selections in only 11-12yo (r=.319, t=2.259, 
p=0.029, BF10=2.18; adults: r=-.010, t=-0.067, p=.947; 6-7yo: r=-.163, t=-1.058, p=.296) (Figure 
3B). Exploratory Fisher’s r-to-z’ transformations indicated that this correlation in older children 
was significantly different from the two other groups combined (z=2.23, p=.026). This pattern of 
results suggests that different age groups might be sensitive to different demand signals for 
adapting later choices to reduce demand.  
Subjective Awareness of Cognitive Demand 
 
 Chi-square tests were run to examine group differences in reporting the low-demand deck 
as preferred. 69% of adults and 78% of 11-12yo reported that they preferred the low-demand 
deck, whereas 6-7yo preferred the low-demand deck at chance levels (49%); significant group 
differences were observed in reported deck preference (c2= 8.846; p=.012, BF10=5.544). We then 
tested whether each group differed from chance self-reported preference using a single 
proportion test against chance. Adults and 11-12yo preferred the low-demand deck significantly 
more than chance (adults: c12=6.422, p=.011, BF10= 6.136; 11-12yo: c12=14.696, p<.001, BF10= 
316.30), where 6-7yo did not (c12=0.023, p=.879). The same analyses were performed for 
reporting the low-demand deck as easier. 71% of adults and 72% of 11-12yo reported that the 
low-demand deck was easier, whereas 6-7yo reported the low-demand deck as easier at near 
chance levels (44%); significant differences in reporting the low-demand deck as easier were 
observed between groups (c2=9.2691; p<.01, BF10=6.297). Single proportion tests indicated that 
adults and 11-12yo reported the low-demand deck as easier significantly more than chance 
(adults: c12=8.022, p<.01, BF10=12.861; 11-12yo: c12=8.696, p<.01, BF10=17.578), whereas 6-
7yo did not (c12=0.5814, p=0.446). The high majority of adults and 11-12yo were consistent in 
reporting the same deck for both questions (93.33% of adults and 93.48% of 11-12yo), whereas 
only 67.44% of 6-7yo were consistent; a chi-square test indicated group differences in answer 
consistency (c2:15.505; p<.001, BF10=113.653), indicating that younger switched decks between 
questions more frequently (Table 2). Analysis of explanations for deck self-reported deck 
preference and easy deck selections are reported in Appendix B, and all participant responses are 
provided in Appendix C. 
Motivational Frameworks and Demand Avoidance 
 
We explored whether motivational frameworks negatively correlated with low-demand 
deck preference across child groups, reasoning that a child with a growth mindset motivational 
framework may intentionally select the high-demand deck. The standardized intelligence-domain 
score and composite score were not correlated with low-demand deck preference (intelligence 
domain: r=.07, p=.63; composite: r=.19, p=.18). 
Discussion 
Younger children, older children, and adults all exhibited signals of control demands, 
with significantly higher accuracy and faster RTs on rule repeat than switch trials. Moreover, 
accuracy and log RT costs for rule switch trials were similar across groups, suggesting that all 
groups had similar signals of control demands. However, only adults and 11-12yos significantly 
avoided unnecessary cognitive control demands, whereas 6-7yo children did not (although the 
omnibus tests did not reach significance). Both older children and adults also exhibited evidence 
of subjective awareness of the differential control demands between decks. Adults and 11-12yo 
were significantly more likely than 6-7yo to report the low-demand deck as both preferred and 
easier, and adults and 11-12yo children also reported the low-demand deck as preferred and 
easier significantly more often than chance. The types of demand signals used to guide behavior 
also differed by age; response time switch costs predicted low-demand deck preference in adults, 
whereas accuracy switch costs predicted low-demand deck preference in older children. Neither 
response time nor accuracy costs predicted low-demand deck selections in 6-7yo. Thus, older 
children and adults appear to be sensitive to and subsequently adapt behavior away from 
unnecessary cognitive control demands in ways that 6-7yo children do not.  
However, children as young as 5 years old have been shown to coordinate behavior away 
from difficult tasks taxing more automatic cognitive processes, such as the approximate number 
system, when receiving feedback and provided exposure to each task prior to being able to 
choose which task to play (O’Leary, 2017), similar to our DST paradigm. Notably, the accuracy 
differences between the high- and low-demand options in this dot discrimination task in 5yo 
(90% vs. 52%) were much higher than the accuracy switch costs for child groups in the DST 
(7.56% and 5.70% for 11-12yo and 6-7yo, respectively). Thus, the smaller accuracy costs in our 
paradigm might not provide a sufficient demand signal for 6-7yo children to detect demand 
differences. Still, that accuracy switch costs predicted low-demand deck selections in 11-12yo 
suggests that older children may specifically tune to their lower accuracy after rules switches and 
subsequently avoid task options that involve frequent rule switches. Trial feedback may provide 
additional support for children’s assessments of cognitive control demands.  
Our results coincide well with proposed mechanistic neural links to the avoidance of 
effortful cognitive control in adults. If the proposed ability of dACC to provide error and effort 
signals improves with age, then younger children, even with similar control demands, should 
have a weaker neural signal to guide adaptive behavior due to underdeveloped dACC 
functioning. An especially strong demand signal, such as the large discrepancy in accuracy 
between the high- and low-demand options in the dot discrimination in O’Leary (2017), may be 
needed for very young children to adapt behavior. Further, if functional connectivity between 
dACC and areas of lPFC is required for individuals to utilize a demand signal to adaptively 
coordinate behavior to reduce control demands, young children, whose control networks 
involving dACC and PFC are still reorganizing and strengthening (Luna et al., 2010), should be 
less able to coordinate behavior. Better working memory may also be needed to monitor task 
performance (Luna et al., 2010), and working memory continues to improve with age (Siegel & 
Ryan, 1989; Luna, Garver, Urban, Lazar, & Sweeney, 2004); the lateral PFC regions implicated 
in cognitive control and effort avoidance are also recruited in mature working memory (Curtis & 
D’Esposito, 2003), and activity in PFC regions during working memory tasks increases with age 
(Casey, Cohen, Jezzard, Turner, Noll, & Trainor, 1995).  
Given that our DST version included both feedback and long-term performance tracking, 
striatum may also be implicated in a neurodevelopmental explanation of the current results. 
Striatum has been strongly implicated in feedback-related learning, with enhanced striatal 
sensitivity to feedback in adolescence relative to childhood and adulthood (Peters & Crone, 
2017). Thus, the feedback provided may have supported older children in assessing relative 
cognitive demands. Additionally, striatum has been shown to reflect effort/reward trade-offs in 
cognitive control (Croxson, Walton, O’Reilly, Behrens, & Rushmore, 2009), and projections 
from dACC to striatal regions may mediate feedback-related signals in striatum (Shenhav et al., 
2013). Further, functional connectivity between lPFC and striatal regions improves throughout 
development (Rubia, 2013), and thus, young children may not be able to effectively register the 
effort/reward trade-offs in response to feedback within our child-adapted DST. In sum, adaptive 
coordination may not be possible in young children due to working memory limitations in 
tracking long-term task-specific performance and immature development of dACC and lPFC, as 
well as still-forming connections between these regions including striatum, to provide effort 
signals and guide subsequent behavior. 
Additional research with larger samples sizes is needed to determine the nature of 
potential differences in control demand avoidance across development. Future research could 
also instantiate greater differences in control demands between task options or parametrically 
manipulate control demand to examine effort sensitivity differences across development. Future 
research should also continue to investigate the types of cues needed to establish subjective 
awareness of control demands and how these cues may differ across ages. The heterogeneity in 
results of control demand avoidance in adults across studies suggests that individuals may differ 
in the types of cues and instructions leveraged to adapt behavior. Additionally, the neural 
mechanisms supporting subjective cognitive demand awareness and adaptive behavior control 
should be investigated across development. Sensitivity to control demands and adaptive response 
behavior appear to develop alongside cognitive control, and theories of control development 
should therefore also incorporate considerations of how and when children decide to implement 
cognitive control. 
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Figure 1. Demand Selection Task Flow. Participants completed 40 familiarization trials 
(20/deck), 20 forced choice trials (10/deck), and then 102 free choice trials. Probes were 
presented at the bottom of the screen for answer reminders. The left and right green rectangles 
depict decks of toys; one deck switched sorting rules on 90% of trials (high-demand), whereas 
the other deck switched on 10% of trials (low-demand). 
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Figure 2: Proportion of low-demand deck selections across block and across groups. Older 
children (11-12yo) and adults selected the low-demand deck significantly more than chance 
overall (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p<.05). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 3: A) Log response time switch costs predicted the proportion of low-demand deck 
selections in adults (r=.35; p=.020); B) Accuracy costs predicted the proportion of low-demand 
deck selections in older children (r=.32; p=.029). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1    
Deck Familiarization Performance Across Age Groups  
 Adults 11-12yo 6-7yo 
    
Switch Trial Accuracy 85.81% (7.93) 81.67% (10.51) 85.28% (11.42) 
Repeat Trial Accuracy 92.75% (6.46) 89.23% (8.97) 90.98% (9.71) 
Accuracy Cost 6.93% (7.48)★ 7.56% (8.60)★ 5.70% (8.15)★ 
    
Switch Trial Response 
Time* 6.73 (0.18) 7.10 (0.29) 7.80 (0.34) 
Repeat Trial Response Time* 6.63 (0.20) 6.99 (0.32) 7.72 (0.32) 
Response Time Cost 0.101 (0.11)★ 0.114 (0.15)★ 0.078 (0.16)★ 
Data are presented as means (SD). Response times as reported as log-transformed from mean millisecond response 
times for each participant. * indicates significant group differences at p<.001. ★ indicates significant switch costs at 
p<.001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2    
Low-Demand Deck Preferences and Awareness of Subjective Effort and Adaptive Behavior Across 
Groups 
       
 Adults 11-12yo 6-7yo 
Proportion of Low-Demand 
Deck Selections 58.04% (28.54)^ 63.29% (24.83)* 52.27% (31.42) 
Proportion Reporting 
Preference for the Low-
Demand Deck 68.89%^ 78.26%* 48.84% 
Proportion Reporting the 
Low-Demand Deck as 
Easier 71.11%* 71.74%* 44.19% 
Data are presented as means (SD). ^ indicates significant differences from chance at p<.05, and * at p<.01. 
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